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Parenthood and Artificial Human Reproduction: the 
Dangers of Inappropriate Medicalisation 
 
Kenneth McK. Norrie 
School of Law, University of Strathclyde 
 
Introduction 
In 1992 Professor Sheila McLean edited a volume of essays entitled Law Reform 
and Human Reproduction.1  Reflecting her consistent internationalist approach to 
legal study, the volume contained contributions from Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Czechoslovakia (as it then was), France, the United States and ± my own 
contribution ± the United Kingdom.  That chapter focused on the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990, which the UK Parliament had recently enacted as a 
response to the legal and ethical issues arising from the developing medical 
technologies that had been explored in the Warnock Committee Report.2  The major 
purpose of the 1990 Act was the regulation of medically assisted reproduction, and 
the licensing of its providers, and many of the issues covered in my contribution to 
that earlier book are examined in the present volume by Rebecca Cook and Bernard 
Dickens.3  As well as dealing with regulatory issues, the 1990 Act, under the 
KHDGQRWH³6WDWXV´also set out the legal rules for identifying who were the parents of 
a child whose existence had been brought about by the processes regulated under 
the Act.4  The issue of parenthood certainly does not lie outwith Sheila McLean¶V
broad field of interest, and she has had a direct impact on at least one aspect of the 
                                                          
1 Dartmouth, 1992. 
2 Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilistion and Embryology  ? “dŚĞtĂƌŶŽĐŬŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ) ?ŵŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?
(1984). 
3 Above, chapter ? 
4 Ss.27-30 of the 1990 Act. 
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parenthood provisions in the 1990 Act, by chairing a review set up by the UK 
Department of Health into parenthood after the posthumous removal of gametes: 
some of the recommendations in her report, published in 1998,5 were enacted as the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 2003 and then re-
enacted as s.39 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.6 
The 2008 Act itself was a response to the substantially increased scientific 
understandings and capabilities in relation to medically assisted reproduction since 
1990, but the opportunity was also taken to update WKH ³VWDWXV´ SURYLVLRQV in the 
earlier Act, in light both of the experiences in operating these provisions, which had 
proved to be much more technically troublesome than had been anticipated, and of 
the changing social realities of family life that had been experienced since the 1990 
Act 7KHYHU\ZRUG³VWDWXV´XVHG LQ the 1990 Act to describe the issue, illustrates 
perfectly how dated the underlying assumptions of that Act were.  A new set of rules, 
XQGHU WKH OHVV UHFRQGLWH KHDGLQJ ³3DUHQWKRRG LQ &DVHV ,QYROYLQJ $VVLVWHG
5HSURGXFWLRQ´ZDVHQDFWHGLQ3WRIWKH$FW7 
If anything, the social revolution in attitudes both to family life and family law was 
even more stark than the revolution in scientific capacity since 1990.  A non-
discrimination imperative had (none too soon) been embraced by law- and policy-
makers, and same-sex couples (long used to constructing for themselves non-
WUDGLWLRQDO IDPLOLHV RXWZLWK WKH ODZ¶V regulation8) embraced the technologies that 
made non-traditional methods of human reproduction possible.  But the match was 
and remains ill-fitting.  The 1990 Act constructed ³LQIHUWLOLW\´ DV D PHGLFDO SUREOHP
and offered regulation of medically assisted reproduction as the legal solution.  Yet 
                                                          
5 Review of the Common Law Provisions Relating to the Removal of Gametes and of the Consent Provisions of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (Department of Health, 1998). 
6 This allows a deceased man to be registered as the father of a child brought into existence by the use of his 
sperm after his death. 
7 The status provisions in the 1990 Act were not repealed and they continue to determine parenthood for 
children conceived after the coming into force of that Act (on August 1, 1991), but before the coming into 
force (on April 6, 2009) of Pt 2 of the 2008 Act. 
8 See K. Weston, Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship (Columbia University Press, 1998); K. Almack, 
 “^ĞĞŬŝŶŐ^ƉĞƌŵ PĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨ>ĞƐďŝĂŶŽƵƉůĞƐ ?ZĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making and Understanding the Needs of 
ƚŚĞŚŝůĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Int. J Law Pol and Family 1-22. 
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WKH³LQIHUWLOLW\´RIsame-sex couples is not traced to any physical deficiency amenable 
to medical intervention: rather it comes from the biological reality that they simply 
cannot themselves provide all the genetic material necessary to create children.  It is 
no surprise, therefore, that same-sex couples continue to access artificial 
reproductive technologies by non-medicalised routes.  It is the purpose of this 
chapter to examine the continuing appropriateness of constructing the issue as a 
medical as opposed to a social problem and to highlight, through the case law, an 
emerging gender tension that this has given rise to. 
 
The Importance of Parenthood 
Why is parenthood9 important?  In the United Kingdom the significance of the 
TXHVWLRQRIZKRDFKLOG¶VSDUHQWVDUHWRWKHZHOIDUH-based judgments courts are all 
WRR RIWHQ DVNHG WR PDNH DERXW WKH FKLOG¶V XSEULQJLQJ KDV ORQJ EHHQ D PDWWHU RI
dispute10 (typically played out in applications for residence and contact orders11) but 
it has never been suggested that the matter is of no relevance and it is not without 
significance that parties to disputes DERXWWKHFKLOG¶VSDUHQWLQJcontinue themselves 
to raise the issue of parenthood (in an attempt to strengthen their own case or to 
weaken their opponents¶).  The House of Lords endorsed the use of the word 
³SDUHQW´ WRFRYHUSHUVRQVZKRZHUHQRWJHQHWLFDOO\ UHODWHG WR RUKDGDGRSWHG WKH
child in Re G (Children) (Residence: Same-Sex Partner)12 and though Baroness 
                                                          
9 /ĂŵƵƐŝŶŐ “ƉĂƌĞŶƚŚŽŽĚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚĂůůƵƐƵƐĞƐƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ƉĂƌĞŶƚĂŐĞ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ
ƚŽƐĂǇƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌŽŐĞŶŝƚŽƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŽĨĨƐƉƌŝŶŐ Pd ?ĂůůƵƐ ? “EĞǁWĂƌĞŶƚŚŽŽĚ
Paradigm for  Twenty-first Century FamŝůǇ>ĂǁŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚĂŶĚtĂůĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?LS 347-368.  She reserves 
 “ƉĂƌĞŶƚŚŽŽĚ ?ĨŽƌǁŚĂƚ/ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂƐ “ƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶŐ ? ?dŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶǁĞďŽƚŚĚƌĂǁŝƐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ?ďƵƚ/ĂĚŽƉƚƚŚĞ
terminology of parenthood and parenting to emphasise that the dichotomy is betweeŶ “ƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?as a noun and 
 “ƉĂƌĞŶƚ ? as a verb ?/ƚĂůƐŽĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁĂǇƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ƉĂƌĞŶƚŚŽŽĚ ?ŝƐƵ ĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŶŽƚĞƚŽƚŚĞ
relevant provisions in the 2008 Act. 
10 Is parenthood neutral to the welfare judgment, as the House of Lords seemed to suggest in J v C [1970] AC 
668, or a presumptive starting point, as the Court of Appeal held in Re K (A Minor) (Custody) [1990] 3 All ER 
 ? ? ? ?^ĞĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?< ?ǀĞƌĞƚƚĂŶĚ> ?zĞĂƚŵĂŶ ? “ƌĞ^ŽŵĞWĂƌĞŶƚƐDŽƌĞEĂƚƵƌĂůƚŚĂŶKƚŚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?CFLQ 
290-309. 
11 Kƌ “ĐŚŝůĚĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŽƌĚĞƌƐ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǁŶŐůŝƐŚƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇ ? 
12 [2006] UKHL 43, [2006] 1 WLR 2305. 
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+DOH IDPRXVO\ DOORZHG WKH ZRUG ³SDUHQW´ WR PHDQ HLWKHU D JHQHWLF SDUHQW D
gestational parent or a social and psychological parent, the context in which these 
FRPPHQWV ZHUH PDGH LQGLFDWH WKDW VKH KDG LQ PLQG ³SDUHQW´ DV VRPHRQH who 
parents a child as opposed to someone with parenthood status:13 it is to be noted 
that she never allowed the social or psychological parent in that case the title of 
³PRWKHU´  ,Q ILHOGV QRW XOWLPDWHO\ JRYHUQHG E\ WKH ZHOIDUH RI WKH FKLOG VXFK DV
succession, child support and maintenance, ³parent´ KDV a more absolutist 
(generally biological) meaning LUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHVRFLDOUHDOLWLHVRIWKHFKLOG¶VOLIH14  
,W LVQRWKRZHYHUFUXFLDO WKDW WKHVDPHSHRSOHVKRXOGEH LGHQWLILHGDV³SDUHQWV´ LQ
every context in which the question arises.  And, of course, as Campbell points out,15 
WKHODZ¶VFRQFHSWLRQRI³SDUHQW´PD\EHYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURPDQ\LQGLYLGXDOFKLOG¶V. 
 
Parenthood Disputes Prior to 1990 
Parenthood disputes have always been strongly gendered, reflecting the very 
different interests of each gender.  Before the passing of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990, such formal law as there was on determining how the parent-
child relationship was to be established focused on the identification of the father: the 
identification of the mother was not perceived to create any room for dispute.  For it 
is a truth that has bedevilled the male psyche since the dawn of time that, while 
women always know who their children are, men never do.  Men are reliant on 
                                                          
13 Cf Alliance for Marriage and Family v AA [2007] 3 SCR 124 where the Supreme Court of Canada rejected an 
appeal (if on a matter of title) against a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal (2007) ONCA 2  that a child had 
two mothers (the women who were bringing him up) and a father (the genetic progenitor who played a 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉĂƌƚŝŶƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐůŝĨĞ ) W the application to be recognised as a mother had been brought by the 
partner of the genetic mother, with the support of both genetic parents.  Interestingly the Ontario Court of 
Appeal contemplated that this recognition would have effect for succession and immigration purposes as well 
as granting a status and role in the upbringing of the child.  ^ĞĞ> ?,ĂƌĚĞƌĂŶĚD ?dŚŽŵĂƌĂƚ ? “WĂƌĞŶƚĂŐĞ>ĂǁŝŶ
ĂŶĂĚĂ PdŚĞEƵŵďĞƌƐ'ĂŵĞŽĨ^ƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚ^ƚĂƚƵƐ ? ? ? ?12) 26 Int. J Law Pol. and Fam. 62-87, who suggest 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂǁ ?ƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽŵƵůƚŝ-parenting models is to a large extent explained by its rejection of 
polygamy as a legitimate family form. 
14 So for example the child in Re G (n.12 above) will inherit from its legal parent (the gestational mother) but 
(absent a will) not from those who parent him, such as the gĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ. 
15 A. Campbell,  “ŽŶĐĞŝǀŝŶŐWĂƌĞŶƚƐdŚƌŽƵŐŚ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Int. J. Law Pol. and Fam. 242-273.  
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information provided by women.  The law has long attempted to provide men with 
some certainty by creating presumptions of paternity from known facts, the most 
important, and most wide-spread, of which is that a child born to a married woman is 
WKHFKLOGRI WKHZRPDQ¶VKXVEDQG pater vero is est, quem nuptiae demonstrant.16  
7KLV LV D SUHVXPSWLRQ RI ELRORJLFDO FRQQHFWLRQ GUDZQ IURP WKH PDQ¶V UHODWLRQVKLS
with the mother: fatherhood, in other words, has traditionally been located in a 
combination of biology and relationship with the mother, though biology is the sole 
determining factor in the absence of the appropriate relationship.17 
Maternity disputes are different from paternity disputes, in concept, motivation and 
outcome.  The doctrine in the Digest, mater semper certa est etiam si vulgo 
conceperit,18 reflects the fact that for most of human history there was no basis 
conceived possible, other than pregnancy and childbirth, upon which maternity could 
be identified.  That ancient certainty was, of course, shattered by the development of 
medical techniques for creating a child using the genetic material of one woman and 
the gestational environment of another woman.19  There was much academic 
discussion of the question of how, in the face of that possibility, the law ought to 
GHILQH ³PRWKHU´20  In the absence of legislation, there is no obvious answer to the 
TXHVWLRQ RI ZKHWKHU D ZRPDQ¶V genetic contribution is more important than her 
gestational contribution: in truth, both are essential to the creation of new human life.  
The Warnock Committee, faced with two analogies (basing motherhood on genetics 
                                                          
16 :ƵƐƚŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐDigest, II, iv, 5. 
17 The European Court of Human Rights is highly suspicious of rules of law whose effect is to prevent the 
 ?ďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů )ƚƌƵƚŚŽĨĂĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐƉĂƌĞŶƚŚŽŽĚĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ PƐĞĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚďǇ ?ĂŝŶŚĂŵŝŶ
 “ ‘dƌƵƚŚtŝůůKƵƚ ? PWĂƚĞƌŶŝƚǇŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ? ?7) 66 CLJ 278-282. 
18 n.16 above. 
19 Indeed the development of mitochondrial donation, presaged by s.26 of the 2008 Act (inserting a new s.35A 
into the 1990 Act) and subject to regulations being drafted as this chapter is written (see Department of Health 
CoŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ “DŝƚŽĐŚŽŶĚƌŝĂůŽŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?, draft regulations included / ?^ĂŵƉůĞ ? “dŚƌĞĞ-Person 
/s& Ph<'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂĐŬƐDŝƚŽĐŚŽŶĚƌŝĂůdƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ? ?Guardian, 28 June 2013) will allow the genetic material of 
two women (if in very different proportions) being used. 
20 ^ĞĞ ?^ ?ZŽƐĞƚƚĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? “ĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĂWĂƌĞŶƚ PdŚĞEĞǁŝŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞZĞďŝƌƚŚŽĨƚŚĞFilius Nullius ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ?
New LJ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?^ƚƵŵƉĨ ? “ZĞĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐDŽƚŚĞƌ P>ĞŐĂůDĂƚƌŝǆĨŽƌEĞǁ ZĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?
Yale LJ 187- ? ? ? ?' ?ŽƵŐůĂƐ ? “dŚĞ/ŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞĂWĂƌĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞDĂŬŝŶŐŽĨDŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Mod. LR 636-
641. 
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as fatherhood is, or basing it on a donation model, as they suggested sperm 
donation should be) made a pragmatic choice, which the UK Parliament accepted 
and gave effect to in s.27 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, 
discussed below. 
The very fact that such a choice existed in relation to motherhood reveals a deeper 
WUXWKWKDWSDUHQWKRRGLQWKHH\HVRIWKHODZLVQHYHUWUXO\³QDWXUDO´EXWLVLQVWHDGD
social or legal construct whereby the law chooses to preference one factor over 
another in the definitional quest to locate parenthood in an appropriate individual.  
Genetic connection is the factor that is chosen to identify, for legal purposes, fathers 
and marriage is chosen as the factor that presumes this genetic connection: these 
are choices made by the law no less than gestational connection is the chosen factor 
that identifies mothers.  If this is so, then the parameters of parenthood are as 
vulnerable to social change as any other legal construct.  It is well-recognised that 
IURP D FKLOG¶V SHUVSHFWLYH WKRVH ZKR SDUHQW Ds a verb) tend to have more 
VLJQLILFDQFH WR WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOOEHLQJ WKDQ WKRVH ZKR DUH D SDUHQW DV D QRXQ
indicating a genetic connection): it is not a self-evident truth that the noun is more 
important than the verb.  This is not to deny that knowledge of RQH¶V ³URRWV´ KDV
importance, but merely to suggest that in ranking genetic background with present 
XSEULQJLQJWKHUHLVQRWKLQJ³QDWXUDO´LQFRQFOXGLQJWKDWWKHIRUPHULVPRUHLPSRUWDQW
for any purpose, than the latter. 
 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990: Mothers and their 
Husbands 
There was nothing radical about the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990: 
as with the common law, in determining parenthood one first starts with the mother 
and then one traces fatherhood through the relatioQVKLSWKDWVKHLVLQ³0RWKHU´DV
the lynchpin, requires a clear definition and was given one by s.27 of the 1990 Act, 
as follows: 
7 
 
³7KHZRPDQZKRLVFDUU\LQJRUKDVFDUULHGDFKLOGDVDUHVXOWRIWKHSODFLQJLQ
her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be treated 
DVWKHPRWKHURIWKHFKLOG´ 
This has been the law in the United Kingdom ever since: it is replicated in s.33 of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.  This absolutist approach renders the 
position of women in relation to parenthood far more certain than the position of 
men: the female provider of genetic material, if different from the gestational 
provider, is automatically and for all purposes excluded while the male provider will 
be excluded from parenthood only if various conditions relating to his consent are 
VDWLVILHG DQG HYHQ WKHQ DV ZH ZLOO VHH KH UHWDLQV DQ ³LQWHUHVW´  One of the 
consequences of this, as McCandless and Sheldon point out,21 is that the position of 
the gestational mother in a surrogacy situation is made unchallengeably that of 
³PRWKHU´, with the result that she has absolute control over the parental order 
process and substantial control over the adoption process.  By these means, 
surrogacy arrangements are rendered unenforceable.22 
Starting from the certainty of motherhood, the 1990 Act follows a centuries-long 
tradition in filiation by drawing a fundamental distinction between births to married 
and births to unmarried women.  Section 28(2) provides that if a woman was party to 
a marriage at the time of the placing in her of an embryo, or of sperm and egg, or her 
(artificial) insemination and her husband was not the provider of the (male) genetic 
material, then that husband will nevertheless be regarded by the law as the father of 
the child, though he can avoid paternity by showing that he did not consent to the 
artificial conception.23  This has the effect of transferring fatherhood from the man 
                                                          
21 : ?DĐĂŶĚůĞƐƐĂŶĚ^ ?^ŚĞůĚŽŶ ? “dŚĞ,ƵŵĂŶ&ĞƌƚŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ŵďƌǇŽůŽŐǇĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚƚŚĞdĞŶĂĐŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ
^ĞǆƵĂů&ĂŵŝůǇ&Žƌŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Mod LR 175-207, at 183. 
22 ^ĞĞĂůƐŽ< ?,ŽƌƐĞǇ ? “ŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐWƌĞƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ P>ĞŐĂůWĂƌĞŶƚŚŽŽĚĂŶĚ^ƵƌƌŽŐĂĐǇƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?
CFLQ 449-474. 
23 That the man must consent to the actual impregnation using identified genetic material  W as opposed to 
consent to the idea of impregnation  W is the result of L Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v A [2003] EWHC 259 
(QBD), [2003] 1 FLR 1091. As a matter of strict statutory interpretation this result is questionable, though the 
pragmatic answer is, in a case in which the parties were in no genuine dispute with each other, 
understandable. Consent must be positive and not mere acquiescence, according to M v F [2013] EWHC 1901 
(Fam). 
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who was the biological progenitor to a man who is not.  This is less radical than it 
might sound, for IDWKHUKRRG¶V VWDUWLQJ SRLQW FRQWLQXHV WR EH WKH PDQ¶V UHODWLRQVKLS
with the mother: s.28(2) is little more, then, than a modern manifestation of pater est 
quem nuptiae demonstrant. 
There is, however, an important limitation to the rule in s.28(2), which is that it is 
DSSOLFDEOH RQO\ ZKHQ WKH FKLOG LV FRQFHLYHG WKURXJK ³DUWLILFLDO´ PHDQV  6R LI D
married woman becomes pregnant by sexual intercourse with a man other than her 
husband it is the biological progenitor who will EHWKHFKLOG¶VIDWKHUHYHQ if the intent 
of all parties was that the husband would be ± would perform the role of ± father.24  
This limitation may be a necessary consequence of the fact that the 1990 Act is 
designed to regulate, and to provide parenthood rules following, medically assisted 
reproduction, but if so the rule in s.28(2) is too broad since it applies to self-
administered as well as medically assisted artificial insemination.  :K\DFKLOG¶VOHJDO
paternity should turn on the mechanism by which sperm was introduced into the 
mother is obscure.25 
The rules are rather different if the mother was not married at the time of her 
(artificial) insemination.  In this case, s.28(3) of the 1990 Act provides that the 
PRWKHU¶VPDOHSDUWQHUZLOOEHWUHDWHGLQODZDVWKHIDWKHURIWKHFKLOd if the treatment 
was provided WRWKHZRPDQDQGWKHPDQ³WRJHWKHU´3DWHUQLW\once again, is traced 
WR WKHPRWKHU¶V UHODWLRQVKLS with the man 7KHSKUDVH ³WUHDWPHQW WRJHWKHU´SURYHG
unexpectedly contentious as a matter of statutory interpretation and there followed a 
substantial amount of litigation on the parameters of the phrase.26  The importance of 
the provision, however, must not be overshadowed by its inherent ambiguity.  There 
                                                          
24 Such a husband will have the benefit of the pater est presumption, though of course that presumption is 
always vulnerable to rebuttal  W made more vulnerable in the modern world by the certainties of DNA profiling. 
25 M v F, n.23 above, was decided under the 2008 Act where the rule in s.35 is the same as that in s.28(2) of 
the 1990 Act. The first dispute in that case was whether the pregnancy had come about by sexual intercourse 
(in which case the biological progenitor was the father) or by artificial insemination (in which case the 
consenting husband would be the father).  The second dispute was whether the husband had indeed 
consented. 
26 See for example Re Q (Parental Order) [1996] 1 FLR 369; U v W (Attorney General Intervening) (No. 2) [1997] 
2 FLR 282; R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex p. Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687; Evans v Amicus 
Healthcare Ltd [2005] Fam 1; Re R (A Child) (IVF: Paternity of Child) [2005] UKHL 33, [2005] 2 AC 621. 
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is no prohibition in the 1990 Act on artificial reproductive technology being made 
available to persons other than married couples, though there was a half-hearted 
attempt to encourage treatment providers to preference opposite-sex couples.27  
Children born to unmarried couples, no less than children born to married couples, 
need clear rules identifying who their parents are, and Parliament accepted that 
these rules should permit, as they do with married couples, transference of paternity 
from the biological progenitor to the man intended to play the social role of father. 
However, the application of the rule in s.28(3) is limited to pregnancies that come 
about by licensed medical assistance.  This has the clear effect of pathologising 
artificial insemination, which is entirely inappropriate for female couples where the 
need for a third party contribution is not traced to any medical condition.  Female 
FRXSOHVGRQRWVXIIHUIURPDQ\GLVDELOLW\WKDWQHHGV³WUHDWPHQW´28: their practical need 
is simply for access to sperm, and their legal need (which was not met by the 1990 
Act) is a mHDQVWRWUDQVIHUSDUHQWKRRGIURPWKHSURYLGHURIWKHVSHUPWRWKHPRWKHU¶V
partner. 
In the end, the result of the 1990 Act was not so very different from the common law.  
The crucial distinction in determining parenthood continues to be between married 
and unmarried couples and the right of parenting (in the absence of any further court 
order) remains exclusively vested in that couple.  The provision of a rule establishing 
non-genetic paternity over a child born to an unmarried mother is better seen as an 
aspect of the vastly decreased significance of the concept of illegitimacy than of any 
great shift in legal attitudes towards parenthood itself. 
 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: From Status to Contract 
From around the 1990s, systems of family law across the western world abandoned 
the overtly political purpose of preferencing certain forms of family in favour of 
responding to the functions that families perform irrespective of their makeup.  It was 
                                                          
27 See ^ĂƌĂŚůůŝƐƚŽŶ ?Ɛcontribution to the present volume, below, chapter ? 
28 ^ĞĞZŽďŝŶŽǁŶŝĞ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚǀŽůƵŵĞ Pbelow, chapter ? 
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becoming increasingly obvious that the traditional family model provided too limited a 
focus for the law, and especially so in relation to the parent-child relationship.29  
Unmarried couples, though still without comprehensive financial claims against each 
other in England and Wales, have been permitted to adopt children there since the 
coming into force in 2005 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002; increased financial 
rights and obligations were granted to cohabiting couples30 in Scotland by the Family 
Law (Scotland) Act 2006,31 and joint adoption permitted to cohabiting couples by the 
Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 (coming into force in 2009).  An even 
more significant cultural development since 1990 has been the revolution in attitudes 
towards same-sex couples.32  The law responded to this development by vastly 
increasing the protections afforded to such couples in both family law and equality 
law.  The most important legal development in the UK for same-sex couples between 
1990 and 2008 was of course the Civil Partnership Act 2004, which created a means 
by which same-sex couples could register their relationship with the state and 
acquire thereby virtually all the responsibilities and rights that flow from marriage.33  
7KHVH VRFLDO DQG OHJDO GHYHORSPHQWV UHQGHUHG WKH ³VWDWXV´ SURYLVLRQV LQ WKH
Act woefully out of date and so, when that Act was revised by the 2008 Act, the 
opportunity was taken to amend the parenthood rules to provide (as the adoption 
legislation had already done) for joint parenthood for same-sex couples.  The rules 
determining paternity were extended to female partners of mothers in two ways: (i) 
WKH FLYLO SDUWQHU RI WKH PRWKHU LV GHHPHG WR EH WKH ³IHPDOH SDUHQW´34 RU ³RWKHU
                                                          
29 ^ĞĞ^ ?^ŚĞůĚŽŶ ? “&ƌĂŐŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ&ĂƚŚĞƌŚŽŽĚ PdŚĞZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨZĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Mod LR 
523-553. 
30 Though of lesser value than those of married couples or civil partners. 
31 ^ĞĞ ?^ƵƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚ ? “&ƌŽŵ ‘ŝĚŝĞ- Ŷ ?ƚŽ ‘ŽŚĂďŝƚĂŶƚ ?ŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ PƚŚĞWĞƌŝůƐŽĨ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )
27 Int. J Law Pol. and Fam. 143-175. 
32 This change is explored by < ?EŽƌƌŝĞ ? “&ƌŽŵĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽDĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ PŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂů ?WŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚ
Religious Attitudes in the United Kingdom to Gay ĂŶĚ>ĞƐďŝĂŶ&ĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ? ?ŝŶ, ?WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶ ?: ?D ?sŝůůĂǀĞƌĚĞ ?/ ?>ƵŶĚ-
Andersen (eds), Contemporary Gender Relations and Changes in Legal Cultures (DJØF Publishing, 2013). 
33 And marriage itself was extended to same-sex couples in England and Wales by the Marriage (Same-Sex 
Couples) Act 2013 and will be extended in Scotland by the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Bill 2013. 
34 2008 Act, s.44. 
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SDUHQW´35 of the child on the same basis as WKHPRWKHU¶V husband would be deemed 
to be the father,36 and (ii) the non-registered partner of the mother is deemed to be 
WKH ³IHPDOH SDUHQW´ RU ³RWKHU SDUHQW´ LI ERWK VKH DQG WKH PRWKHU DJUHHG WKDW VKH
should be treated as the parent.37 
The clumsy terminology is to be noted.  The Act cannot bring itself to allow a child to 
KDYH WZR PRWKHUV  ³0RWKHUKRRG´ LV UHVHUYHG WR WKH SURYLGHU RI WKH JHVWDWLRQDO
HQYLURQPHQW DQG KHU SDUWQHU¶V ³parenthood´, traced to the relationship with her, is 
something different, and less absolute.  Just like its 1990 predecessor, the 2008 Act 
starts from the solidity of the dHILQLWLRQRI³PRWKHU´DQGWUDFHVFR-parenthood through 
KHUUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKKHUSDUWQHU7KHPRWKHULVXQVKDNHDEO\WKHFKLOG¶VILUVWSDUHQW 
The unregistered partner of the mother will become father or other (or female) parent 
not, as under the 1990 Act through the fact that licensed treatment has been 
SURYLGHG WR WKH FRXSOH ³WRJHWKHU´ EXW LQVWHDG WKURXJK ERWK WKH PRWKHU DQG WKH
SDUWQHUFRQVHQWLQJ WR WKH ³DJUHHGSDUHQWKRRGFRQGLWLRQV´38  These conditions are, 
as McCandless and Sheldon point out,39 deliberately designed to be contractual in 
nature, which can be seen clearly in the case of Re E and F (Assisted Reproduction) 
(Parents).40  Here, the mothHU¶V SDUWQHU ZDV GHQLHG parenthood because of a 
technical deficiency, rather than anything to do with her relationship with the mother, 
or indeed with the child. The forms by which the mother and her partner signified 
their agreement that the partner be treated as parent were completed just after, 
rather than (as required) before, the insemination treatment was provided.  In 
addition, the forms were regarded as invalid since they had not been preceded by 
WKHUHTXLUHGFRXQVHOOLQJDQGVRWKRXJKVLJQHGKDGQRWEHHQVLJQHGZLWK³Lnformed 
FRQVHQW´  Though a contractual analysis underpins ss.36 and 43, the availability of 
                                                          
35 2008 Act, headnote to ss.42-47. 
36 Section 35 of the 2008 Act, replicating the rule in s.28(2) of the 1990 Act. 
37 Section 43 of the 2008 Act, replicating the new rule in s.36, which replaces s.28(3) of the 1990 Act. 
38 2008 Act, s.36 for men and s.43 for women. 
39 n.21, above, at p.185. 
40 [2013] EWHC 1418 (Fam). 
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the contract is limited to couples who access infertility treatment through licensed 
providers.  As under the 1990 Act, the unregistered partner will be denied 
parenthood ± whatever the terms of any contract or agreement ± if the couple use 
non-medically assisted means (whether sexual intercourse or self-administered 
artificial insemination with privately acquired genetic material).  As we will see, it is 
this exclusion that has caused most difficulties for the courts. 
Notwithstanding its extension of the rules to female couples, the 2008 Act is, in its 
underlying assumptions, as traditionalist as its 1990 predecessor and it creates a 
limited and exclusive legal parenthood that takes as its template the traditional 
nuclear family.  It reflects what McCandless and Sheldon describe41 DV ³SDUHQWDO
GLPRUSKLVP´WKDWLVWRVD\DPRGHOWKDWFDQQRWFRQFHLYHRIPRUHWKDQWZRSDUHQWV
(i) a mother and (ii) her husband or her civil partner or her non-registered partner.  
The two parent model may well have reflected both social reality and legal principle 
when no-one conceived of parenthood in any terms other than biological.  Yet once 
the genetic underpinnings of parenthood are broken ± and a central aim of both the 
1990 and 2008 Acts was to allow that breaking without the necessity of court 
process (ie adoption) ± there is no logical reason why parenthood needs to be kept 
within the bounds of the traditional model.  Callus similarly suggests that if the law 
were to preference parenting over parenthood then the way would be open to multi-
party parenting.42  In truth, this is a plea for the rejection of the distinction between 
parenthood and parenting but the distinction will remain necessary so long as some 
issues (such as succession) are unchallengeably governed by the former while other 
issues (such as parental responsibilities and parental rights) are founded (and 
increasingly so) on the latter.  In any case, multi-party parenting would work only 
when all parties are able to agree roles without misunderstanding and the case law 
to be discussed below suggests that unambiguous agreement is extremely difficult to 
achieve.43 
                                                          
41 McCandless and Sheldon, (n.21, above) at p.188. 
42 Callus, (n.9 above) at p.360. 
43 In the absence of a fully researched empirical study it cannot be known the extent to which such agreements 
work amicably in practice: it is only when they break down that they come to the attention of the courts. 
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One important consequence of the law continuing to trace parenthood through the 
mother is, of course, that the new extensions of the parenthood provisions could not 
be applied to male couples.  The only option for male couples is court action, either 
seeking an adoption order or a parental order following surrogacy.44 The only 
concession made to male couples by the 2008 Act is its extension of title to seek a 
parental order to them so that, reflecting the adoption provisions, both male civil 
partners and male unregistered couples can now seek and obtain parental orders 
after surrogacy.45  However, surrogacy itself is not regulated by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Acts as it is not a practice that requires medical 
intervention.  So medicalization of parenthood has the effect of offering something to 
(some) female couples and nothing at all to any male couple.  The major legal issue 
faced by male couples ± very different from that facing female couples ± is whether 
the payments they make to the surrogate will be authorised by the court.46  So, while 
parenthood has been medicalised for women, it has been monetised for men.  Yet 
contract ± made available to opposite-sex couples and female couples as a means 
of achieving legal parenthood ± is withheld from male couples for any surrogacy 
arrangement they make with a surrogate mother remains, as it has been since 1990, 
statutorily unenforceable.47  The practical needs of male couples seeking parenthood 
are, of course, very different from the practical needs of female couples seeking 
parenthood but the legislature has found it noticeably easier to accommodate the 
legal needs of the latter than those of the former. 
 
                                                          
44 The latter is governed throughout the UK by s.54 of the 2008 Act. 
45 The 1990 Act had limited parental orders to married couples (as, at that time, did the adoption legislation in 
ďŽƚŚ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚĂŶĚŶŐůĂŶĚ ) PƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĐƚĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŚŝƐŽĂůůĐŽƵƉůĞƐ “ŝŶĂŶ ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐĨĂŵŝůǇƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?
(following the formulation in the English adoption legislation).  The provision requiring that one of the 
applicants be genetically related to the child remains (s.54(1)(b)).  And parental orders have never been 
available to single people (s.54(1)), as adoption sometimes is. 
46 See for example Re D (Children) (Surrogacy) (Parental Order) [2012] EWHC 2631 (Fam), [2013] 1 All ER 962; A 
and B v SA [2013] EWHC 426 (Fam); J v G (Parental Orders) [2013] EWHC 1432 (Fam); Re P-M [2013] EWHC 
2328 (Fam). 
47 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, s.1A, as inserted by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, 
s.36(1). 
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The Challenges of Same-Sex Couple Parenthood 
The 1990 Act ignored same-sex couples (male or female) completely, leaving them 
with no option but to construct their own families without legal involvement.48  The 
2008 Act, following the absorption of same-sex couples into family law by the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 and the reforms to adoption law, attempted to meet the 
deficiency, by offering same-sex couples access to joint parenthood.  As we have 
seen, however, the 2008 Act is no less traditionalist than its 1990 predecessor, and 
female couples were offered parenthood recognition under the Act only so long as 
they conformed to the norms long-ago established by heteronormativity.  It is no 
surprise, therefore, that a large number of female couples continue to see more 
attractions in private arrangements than through the medicalised and assimilationist 
options regulated by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Acts.49 This, together 
with the very much more limited options for parenting available to male couples, has 
led men, in particular, to seek to fashion new styles or forms of parenthood which, by 
and large, women have resisted.50  A brave new world for gay and lesbian couples, 
with non-gendered parenting or role expectations ± and with full legal support for 
their designs ± this is not. 
There have been a number of cases before the UK courts in which female couples 
have received sperm from men in return for some involvement LQ WKH FKLOG¶V
upbringing and in which relationships between the parties ± the women on one side, 
the man on the other ± have broken down.51  Cases that come before the courts, 
necessarily involving arrangements that have not worked, cannot, of course, be 
taken to indicate the likelihood of such arrangements being successful.  
                                                          
48 See n.8 above. 
49 See L. Smith,  “dĂŶŐůŝŶŐƚŚĞtĞďŽĨ>ĞŐĂůWĂƌĞŶƚŚŽŽĚ P>ĞŐĂůZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞhƐĞŽĨ<ŶŽǁŶŽŶŽƌƐŝŶ
LesbiaŶWĂƌĞŶƚŝŶŐƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?LS 355-381 at pp.373-374 
50 This may be unfair.  A noticeable feature of the cases to be discussed is that the women nearly always 
envisage some ƌŽůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŵĂŶŝŶƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐůŝĨĞ WũƵƐƚŶŽƚĂƐŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŶĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞƐ ?^ĞĞ> ?^ŵŝƚŚ ? “/Ɛ
dŚƌĞĞĂƌŽǁĚ ?>ĞƐďŝĂŶDŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?WĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶWĂƌĞŶƚĂů^ƚĂƚƵƐŝŶ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?&>Y ? ? ?-252.  And see 
the co-operating three parents in Alliance for Marriage and Family v AA (n.13 above) 
51 US cases with the same factual bases are ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚďǇE ?' ?DĂǆǁĞůů ? “dŚĞ<ĂŶƐĂƐĂƐĞŽĨKMH: US Law 
ŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ>ĞŐĂů^ƚĂƚƵƐŽĨ<ŶŽǁŶ^ƉĞƌŵŽŶŽƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Utrecht LR 135-161. 
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Nevertheless, the contentious cases do reveal how the courts respond to families 
created by non-traditional means, and they provide warnings as to likely sources of 
tension.  The bewildering variety of results in the cases about to be discussed might 
be explained simply by the fact-specificity of any child law case, but Smith is right to 
SRLQW RXW WKDW ³WKH MXGJPHQWV H[KLELW Gisagreements and uncertainties on points of 
SULQFLSDO´.52 This is caused, she suggests, by the fact that orders relating to parenting 
are being used to resolve disputes about the meaning of parenthood. 
A number of common themes emerge from the cases, the most obvious of which is 
the differing perceptions of the parties, even when what looks like clear agreement 
has been reached.  Words mean different things to different people.  So for example 
in L and R v W and W53 the women had advertised for a male couple who, in return 
IRUWKHLUVSHUPZRXOGEHRIIHUHGWKHUROHRI³IDWKHU´DQG³VWHS-IDWKHU´7KHPHQZLWK
whom they entered an agreement to that effect understood these terms very 
differently from the women.  In Re B (Role of Biological Father)54 the role the women 
VDZIRUWKHPDQZDVDQ³DYXQFXODU´RQHWKDWRIDEHQLJQEXWGLVWDQWXQFOHWKHPDQ
saw the chance (and perhaps his only chance) to become a parent in an involving 
sense.  The women felt they could accommodate his desire to be a ³parent´, but both 
sides were using that word to mean very different things.  In the end, the judge 
refused to grant the man parental responsibility on the basis that he was likely to use 
such an order to interfere disproportionately.  7KHZRPHQ¶VSRVLWLRQDVSDUHQWVRIWKH
child was affirmed, for WRDOORZ WKHPDQ ³SDUHQWDO VWDWXV´ ³ZRXOG QRWEHFRQVLVWHQW
ZLWK >WKHZRPHQ¶V@DXWRQRP\DVDQXFOHDU IDPLO\´55  Nevertheless a contact order 
was made, its level being calibrated to allow the child to come to understand the true 
link he had with the man, but without developing a relationship of great importance.  
The judge WDONHGRIWKHIDWKHU¶V³XQLTXHELRORJLFDOVWDWXV´ LQGLFating that this was a 
matter of some importance, but without explaining what that importance entailed. 
                                                          
52 L. Smith, n.49 above, at p.364. 
53 [2011] EWHC 2455 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 1056. 
54 [2007] EWHC 1952 (Fam), [2008] 1 FLR 1015. 
55 [2008] 1 FLR 1015 at 1023. 
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Another feature of these cases, and one that clearly increases the scope for 
misunderstanding, is the lack of appropriate vocabulary to capture in words the true 
nature of the relationships between the parties and the child, and the role each is to 
play.  The failure of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Acts to provide a 
satisfactory title for the female parent who traces her parenthood to her relationship 
with the mother has already been noted.  Connected to this problem is the 
sensitivities that existing language creates.  The women often term the man who 
SURYLGHGWKHVSHUP³WKHGRQRU´DVRSSRVHGWR³WKH IDWKHU´DQG LW LVVRPHWLPHVWKLV
verbal distancing that motivates the man to seek, by court action, some formal 
recognition of his UROH LQ WKHFKLOG¶V OLIH.56  The lack of appropriate vocabulary was 
addressed by Hedley J, in L and R v W and W.57  3RLQWLQJRXW WKDW ³IDWKHU´ ³VWHS-
IDWKHU´DQGVLPLODUZRUGVGHYHORSHGWRGHVFULEHWUDGLWLRQDOIDPLO\DUUDQJHPHQWVZHUH
entirely inappropriate in this type of situation, the judge suggested that the concepts 
RI³SULPDU\SDUHQWV´DQG³VHFRQGDU\SDUHQWV´EHtter encapsulated the realities of the 
situation in such cases.  He designed the order he made to ensure that the men had 
D UROH DOEHLW VHFRQGDU\ LQ WKHFKLOG¶V OLIH D UROH WKDWHQVXUHG WKHFKLOG¶V VHQVHRI
LGHQWLW\ SURYLGHG D ³PDOH FRPSRQHQW LQ SDUHQWLQJ´ DQG D JHQHUDO UROH RI EHQLJQ
SDUHQWLQJ  7KH ZRPHQ ZRXOG UHPDLQ DV ZKDW +HGOH\ - GHVFULEHG DV ³SULQFLSDO
SDUHQWHUV´ DQG WKH PHQDV ³VHFRQGDU\ SDUHQWHUV´.  As in Re B (Role of Biological 
Father), the judge is attempting to structure an order that recognises the women as 
the nuclear family, with the man as a benign, if always external, presence in the 
FKLOG¶VOIH. 
Neither the attempt to structure parenthood at different levels nor the terminology 
suggested by Hedley J found approval in one of the few cases on the issue to reach 
the Court of Appeal.  In A v B58 the Court of Appeal held that there are no principles 
                                                          
56 See for example X v Y 2002 SLT (Sh Ct) 161 (discussed in K. EŽƌƌŝĞ ? “ŽŶƚĂĐƚ ?tĞůĨĂƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞZŝŐŚƚƚŽ ?'ĂǇ )
&ĂŵŝůǇ>ŝĨĞ ? ? ? ? ?SLT (News) 23-27) and Re D [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam), [2006] 1 FCR 556.  
57 n.53 above and, later Re P (Contact) [2011] EWHC 3431 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 1068.  This case has many 
similarities to the long-running litigation in New Zealand ending with P v K [2006] NZFLR 22, thoƵŐŚƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁĂƐǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇŽŶƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ “ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŬŶŽǁďŽƚŚƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
(or at least was assumed by the New Zealand court to preference) the two biological parents.  The European 
Court of Human Rights makes the same assumptions: see n.17 above. 
58  [2012] EWCA Civ 285; [2012] 1 WLR 3456. 
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to guide such cases, other than that the welfare of the child is the determining 
feature.  The implication of this is that identification of parenthood (primary, 
secondary or however it is described) is not a significant factor in determining issues 
of upbringing such as what parental responsibility, or what level of contact, any 
individual should have in respect of any particular child.  ReferrinJ WR +HGOH\ -¶V
approach in L and R7KRUSH/-VDLG³,ZRXOGQRWHQGRUVHWKHFRQFHSWRISULQFLSDO
and secondary parents. It has the danger of demeaning the known donor and in 
VRPH FDVHV WKH\ KDYH DQ LPSRUWDQW UROH´59  Rather, the Court of Appeal saw the 
mother and partner as primary carers and the father as being on the threshold of 
providing secondary care, which did not make him a ³secondary parent´.  Thorp LJ 
nevertheless found QRGLIILFXOW\LQGHVFULELQJDOOWKUHHSDUWLHVDV³SDUHQWV´.60 
7KHPRWKHU¶VSDUWQHU¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\ (especially significant in A v B because the man 
was both the biological father and indeed married to the mother:61 as such he 
automatically possessed full parental responsibilities and parental rights, while the 
partner had none) is a feature underpinning many of the cases.  In the Scottish case 
of X v Y the sheriff exacerbated that vulnerability by conferring parental 
responsibilities and parental rights on the father but withholding them from the 
PRWKHU¶V SDUWQHU.  A clear hieraUFK\ RI ³SDUHQW´ LV DSSDUHQW KHUH ZLWK WKH PRWKHU
(gestationally defined) at the top, followed by the father and then in what seems a 
distant, because always artificial, WKLUG SODFH WKH PRWKHU¶V SDUWQHU  X v Y was of 
course decided before the 2008 Act, wKLFKDOORZV³SDUHQWKRRG´(as well as parental 
responsibilities and parental rights) to be conferred on the partner, but given that the 
SDUWQHU LV XVXDOO\ DV FORVHO\ LQYROYHG LQ WKH FKLOG¶V XSEULQJLQJ DV WKH PRWKHU DQG
more closely involved than the father, it illustrates sharply WKH ODZ¶V UHluctance to 
construct the parental hierarchy in a manner that places parenting on equal terms 
with parenthood.  Millbank LQ GLVFXVVLQJ ZKDW VKH FDOOHG WKH ³Lntra-OHVELDQ´
disputes)62 reminds us that parenting of the sort done by the partner has never 
                                                          
59 [2012] EWCA Civ 285; [2012] 1 WLR 3456 at para. [30]. 
60 [2012] EWCA Civ 285; [2012] 1 WLR 3456 at para. [30]. 
61 The mother had married him in order to hide her sexuality. 
62 : ?DŝůůďĂŶŬ ? “dŚĞ>ŝŵŝƚƐŽĨ&ƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů&ĂŵŝůǇ P>ĞƐďŝĂŶDŽƚŚĞƌ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƌĂŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŶĂůŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
&ĂŵŝůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Int. J. Law, Pol. and Fam. 149-177. 
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FUHDWHG ³SDUHQWKRRG´ZKLOH WKHPDQ¶VELRORJLFDOFRQQHFWLRQ WR WKHFKLOGKLVWRULFDOO\
has done so.  This, she suggests, explains why tKH PDQ¶V ELRORJLFDO VWDWXV LV
afforded greater weight than the partneU¶VSDUHQWLQJUROH 
Courts have often perceived WKHPRWKHU¶VSDUWQHUDVWKHLQWHUORSHU in the family, by 
drawing an analogy with heterosexual breakdown.  So in X v Y the sheriff treated the 
father as if he were a separated parent of a child born to a relationship between the 
mother and the father.  The reality of course was that the relationship into which the 
child was born was between the mother and her female partner who, having been 
involved in the decision to create the child, was in a very different position from a 
step-SDUHQW  ,WZDV WKHPDQDQGQRW WKHSDUWQHUZKRZDV WKH ³LQWHUORSHU´ LQWR WKH
FKLOG¶V OLIH 7KHPDOHFODLPDQW LQRe D63 argued in exactly the same way ± as the 
FKLOG¶VIDWKHUKHKDGPXFKWRRIIHUWKHFKLOGZKLFKWKHZRPHQ¶V(and particularly the 
SDUWQHU¶Vrecalcitrant attitudes were denying the child. 
The tendency to analyse these disputes as if they were traditional separated 
heterosexual parent cases may paradoxically be traced to the decision in Re G 
(Residence: Same-Sex Partner)64 where a new conception of parenthood beyond 
the traditional was first endorsed by the House of Lords.  The judges in that case 
(which was a dispute between the women themselves rather than one of a man 
against a female couple) were at pains to present the case as no different from any 
other residence/contact dispute.  While, from an equality point of view, this has some 
attractions ± ³LW WRRN VH[ RXW RI WKH HTXDWLRQ LQ D KLVWRULFDO OHJDO FRQWH[W LQ ZKLFK
KRPRVH[XVXDOO\RSHUDWHGDVDGLVDGYDQWDJH´65 ± it nevertheless runs the risk of 
failing to recognise, and make appropriate provision for, the complexities of 
individual families and has bedevilled the quite different type of case (men against 
women) being considered here.   
Perhaps the most interesting fHDWXUHRIWKHVH³NQRZQGRQRU´FDVHVLVWKDW in each of  
them men are attempting to create a new form of parenthood where they have 
                                                          
63 [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam), [2006] 1 FCR 556. 
64 [2006] UKHL 43, [2006] 1 WLR 2305. 
65  ?ŝĚƵĐŬ ? “ ‘/ĨKŶůǇtĞĂŶ&ŝŶĚƚŚĞƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞdĞƌŵƐƚŽhƐĞƚŚĞ/ƐƐƵĞtŝůůďĞ^ŽůǀĞĚ ? P>Ăǁ ?/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚ
WĂƌĞŶƚŚŽŽĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?CFLQ 458-480,  at p.461. 
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recognition and some involvement, though less than that expected (or demanded) of 
the traditional father.  Female couples, by and large, have preferred to replicate the 
nuclear model of family life (as a means of providing security to the position of the 
partner) and the courts have been reluctant to move beyond that model.  In Re D,66 
for example, the judge granted parental responsibility to the man, though removed it 
RIPXFKRILWVFRQWHQWLQRUGHUWRJLYHUHFRJQLWLRQWRWKHPDQDVD³SDUHQWRIDYHU\
GLIIHUHQW VRUW´.67  Smith suggests that this is a judicial attempt to recognise the 
differing aims of the parties ± the women wanted affirmation that they were the 
decision-PDNHUVLQWKHFKLOG¶VOLIHWKHPDQZDQWHGUHFRJQLWLRQRIKLVVWDWXVDVIDWKHU 
± but criticises the result as being at odds with the existing legal position of 
distinguishing between parenthood and parenting: an order relating to parenting was 
XVHG WR UHFRJQLVH WKH PDQ¶V SDUHQWKRRG.68  7KH PDQ¶V LQIOXHQFH over WKH FKLOG¶V
upbringing was again the issue in R v E (Female Parent: Known Father),69 where the 
issue of parenthood once again influenced the decision on a question of parenting. 
The man¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ for a residence order ± sought as a result of disagreement 
that DURVH EHWZHHQ WKH PDQ DQG WKH ZRPHQ DERXW FHUWDLQ DVSHFWV RI WKH FKLOG¶V
upbringing ± was refused, though a contact order was made on his behalf and a joint 
residence order in favour of the women was also made.  Bennett J said that the 
IDWKHUKDGQHYHUEHHQD³FR-SDUHQW´± meaning it seems he had never adopted the 
role of social or psychological parent, and though he was the genetic parent who had 
a real relationship with the child, that was not regarded as giving him any sort of veto 
RYHU KRZ WKH ZRPHQ ZKRP WKH SDUWLHV KDG DJUHHG ZHUH WKH FKLOG¶V ³SDUHQWV´
brought up the child.  The man was in no better position than, for example, a 
concerned granGSDUHQWZKRGLVDSSURYHGRIVRPHDVSHFWVRIKLVRUKHUJUDQGFKLOG¶V
upbringing at the hands of the parents.  The judge was more influenced by the social 
                                                          
66 [2006] EWHC (Fam) 2, [2006] 1 FCR 556. 
67 [2006] EWHC (Fam) 2 at para [93].   
68 n.49 at pp.364- ? ? ? ?,ĞƌƉŽŝŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƌĂƌĞĨŽƌĂĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƉĂƌĞŶƚĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽďĞ
refused, even when day to day care of the child is being provided by others. The case may be better explained 
by the judge at the end of her judgment: at para [94] Black J pointed out that the practical reality of her order 
was to ensure ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĂŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŶĞĞĚĞĚǁĞƌĞƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌĞǀĞƌƚŽƐĞĞŬƚŽĂĚŽƉƚƚŚĞ
child (and cut him off completely).  
69 [2010] EWHC 417 (Fam). 
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realities than biological background, but the reasoning is still fundamentally 
traditionalist: Callus uses this FDVHWR LOOXVWUDWHKHUFRQWHQWLRQ WKDWWKH³WZRSDUHQWV
DQGQRPRUH´PRGHODGRSWHGE\WKHODZFUHDWHVWHQVLRQVWKDWXOWLPDWHO\GHWUDFWIURP
WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH70 7KH SDUWLHV¶ RZQ DWWHPSWV WR FRQVWUXFW D PDWUL[ RI IDPLO\
relationships beyond a traditional model failed because they were unable to agree its 
parameters ± and the court responded by setting traditionalist parameters for them. 
The continuing strength of the biological claim to parenthood is shown starkly in the 
first case in which the 2008 Act was directly applicable and in which, therefore, the 
biological link had been rendered legally irrelevant.  What is remarkable about Re G 
(A Child),71 where the Act effected a transference of parenthood from the men to the 
women, and revealing how embedded traditionalist ideas of the role of men and 
women in parenting are, is that the consequences of that transference were 
effectively ignored by the court.  The case involved one male couple, two female 
couples and three children. The disputes were entirely typical: the men had 
understood a far greater involvement in the lives of the children than the women had 
either contemplated or were comfortable with.  After some years of disagreement, 
the men eventually went to court, seeking both parental responsibility (over their own 
biological children) and contact (in relation to all three children).  Their problem was 
that, both female couples being in civil partnerships and the conceptions having 
been achieved by artificial (though not medically-assisted) insemination, the female 
SDUWQHUVRIWKHPRWKHUVZHUH³SDUHQWV´XQGHUWKHWHUPVRIs.42 of the 2008 Act and 
WKHPHQ¶VSDUHQWDOFRQQHFWLRQV WR WKHFKLOGUHQZHUHDVDFRQVHTXHQFHFRPSOHWHO\
severed.  The result, in English law, was that the men (as strangers to the children) 
QHHGHGWRREWDLQWKHFRXUW¶V OHDYHWRVHHNWKHRUGHUV72 and the decision relates to 
the application for leave.  The men argued that the children would benefit by knowing 
who their fathers were (blithely ignoring the legal point that these children had no 
fathers); the women argued that to grant leave to the men would subvert the policy 
behind the 2008 Act, which the judge accepted was to allow lesbian couples to be 
                                                          
70 Callus, (n.9 above) at p.353. 
71  [2013] EWHC 134 (Fam), [2013] 1 FLR 1334. 
72 ^ĐŽƚƐůĂǁĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĐŽƵƌƚůĞĂǀĞŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ PĂŶǇƉĞƌƐŽŶ “ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ŵĂǇƐĞĞŬ
an order under s.11(3)(a)(i) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. 
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joint ± and exclusive ± parents. Leave to seek contact orders was granted to both 
men,73 and the interesting feature of the case is why: the judge held that the men 
were, whatever the 2008 Act says, the biological parents of the children and this 
gave them a clear interest entitling them to seek contact.  They might not be legal 
fathers but they were, when all is said and done, fathers.  This reflects, if in starker 
form since the law had acted to terminate fatherhood, the biological determinism 
LQKHUHQWLQIRUH[DPSOH%ODFN-¶VDFFHSWDQFHLQRe D74  WKDWVKHZDV³FRQVLGHUDEO\
LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKH UHDOLW\ WKDW 0U % LV '¶V IDWKHU  :KDWHYHU QHZ GHVLJQV KXPan 
beings have [including, she may be taken to imply, legal designs] for the structures 
of their families, that aspect of nature cannot EHRYHUFRPH´0U%LV'¶VIDWKHURQO\LI
ZHDGKHUHZKDWHYHUWKHODZVD\VWRELRORJ\DVWKH³WUXH´GHILQLWLRQRISDUHQWKRRG 
The biological connection, therefore, continues to give an interest notwithstanding 
the terms of the 2008 Act and the cutting of the parental link is not as absolute as it 
appears.  It may, however, be that biology gives an interest in this way only to men, 
for it is not at all clear that the same result would have been reached in relation to a 
biological mother who, on egg donation, lost her claim to the status of mother.  It is 
unlikely that such a woman ZRXOGEHKHOGWRUHWDLQD³FOHDU LQWHUHVW´even after the 
law had cut off her maternity.  The egg donor, though biologically linked to the child, 
LV QRW LQ DQ\ OHJDO VHQVH WKH ³PRWKHU´ DQG SHUKDSV VKH LV QRW WKH PRWKHU LQ DQ\
socially understood sense either (except in the eyes of the geneticist).  Perhaps an 
explanation for this difference in treatment is to be found deep in our (gendered) 
psyche: men who donate genetic material seem to need a continuing connection 
with the products of that material far more than women who donate genetic material.  
,VXVSHFW WKDW LI WUXHWKLV LVDFRQVHTXHQFHRI WKHIDFW WKDWIRUPRVWRIKXPDQLW\¶V
history, the biological connection (even when presumed) was all that a father had, 
while a mother had (and is expected to have) a clear nurturing role.  It is no mere 
HW\PRORJLFDOTXLUN WKDW WKHZRUGV ³PRWKHU´DQG ³IDWKHU´ carry, when used as verbs, 
                                                          
73 Leave was denied in respect of residence orders since the children were being perfectly well looked after by 
their mothers.  Seeking residence as opposed to contact is likely to be nothing more than a negotiating tactic 
in many cases. 
74 [2006] 1 FCR 556 at p.582. 
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very different connotations ± to mother is to nurture while to father is to do no more 
than to procreate. 
$OO RI WKH FDVHV FRQVLGHUHG DERYH FRQFHUQHG TXHVWLRQV UHODWLQJ WR WKH FKLOG¶V
upbringing and each, therefore, required ultimately to be decided on the basis that 
the welfare of the child ± as opposed to ZKR WKH FKLOG¶V SDUHQWV DUH ± was 
paramount.  As such, they are all in their fundaments part of the long-running debate 
around the extent to which a parental relationship, however that is established, 
affects the welfare judgment.75  However, parenthood as a matter of fact is 
sometimes determinative of questions to which the welfare judgment has never been 
relevant. For example the law of intestate succession operates on the assumption 
that a child has (at most) two parents, identified in an absolutist sense: parenthood is 
determinative of succession irrespective of who is parenting the child.  There is no 
doubt that a person identified as a parent by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
$FWV  RU  ZLOO EH D ³SDUHQW´ IRU WKH SXUSRVHV RI WKH ODZ RI intestate 
succession and that the cutting of the parental links embodied in these Acts will be 
given effect without qualification.  The biological fathers in Re G (A Child)76 are, 
therefore, not the children¶V IDWKHUV IRUVXFFHVVLRQSXUSRVHVHYHQwhile they have 
an interest, traced to their biological parenthood, entitling them to seek some 
parenting UROHLQWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VOLYHV 
7KH &KLOG 6XSSRUW $FW  VLPLODUO\ OLPLWV LWV REOLJDWLRQV WR ³SDUHQWV´ DV VWULFWO\
defined by law.77 Private law claims for maintenance will turn on the interpretation of 
the appropriate statute.  In T v B78 a female couple had a child after artificial 
insemination from an unknown donor through a clinic licensed under the 1990 Act.  
This cut off the male GRQRU¶V SDWHUQLW\ EXW without (as the 2008 Act would 
subsequently do) transferring parenthood WR WKH PRWKHU¶V IHPDOH SDUWQHU, but the 
partner nevertheless obtained an order under the Children Act 1989 allowing her to 
share in the parenting of the child.  After the couple separated the mother failed in 
                                                          
75 See n.10, above. 
76 [2013] EWHC 134 (Fam), [2013] 1 FLR 1334. 
77 See Re M (Child Support Act: Parentage) [1997] 2 FLR 90. 
78 [2010] EWHC 1444 (Fam), [2010] Fam 193. 
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her attempt to enforce a maintenance obligation against the partner.  This obligation 
was imposed by the Children Act 198979 RQDQ\RQHZKRZDVD³SDUHQW´RIWKHFKLOG, 
but that word in that context was held to be limited to biological parents and those 
who had become parents by operation of the law (such as through adoption) and so 
did not extend to persons who (merely) had parental responsibility.  On the other 
hand, in Scotland an obligation of aliment (private maintenance) is owed not only by 
D³SDUHQW´E\ZKLFKLVSUHVXPDEO\PHDQWDOHJDOSDUHQWWRKLVRUKHUFKLOGEXWDOVR
E\DSHUVRQ WRD FKLOGZKRKDV ³EHHQDFFHSWHGE\KLPDVDFKLOGRIKLV IDPLO\´80  
There is some scope in Scotland therefore for financial obligation to be traced to 
factual parenting as well as to biological parenthood. 
 
Conclusion 
It is tempting to see the 2008 Act as a radical re-imagining of parenthood, with its 
move away from genetic definitions and its embracing of gay and lesbian families; 
the very complexity of the parenthood provisions seems designed to reflect the 
multiplicity of modern family forms.  It is more likely, however, that as Eijkholt 
suggests81 the 2008 Act was not designed to embrace personal or procreative 
autonomy82 but to do no more than to make certain technologies available for 
therapeutic reasons only.  If this is so then the parenthood provisions in the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Acts are properly to be seen not as liberalising 
measures but merely as necessary consequences of the regulation contained in the 
Acts of therapeutic treatment.  Neither the recognition of joint parenthood for 
unmarried couples (the major innovation of the 1990 Act) nor the extension of the 
                                                          
79 Sched. 1 para 1. 
80 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, s.1(1)(d).  A similar result is achieved in Canada: Chartier v Chartier [1999] 1 
SCR 242. 
81 D ?ŝũŬŚŽůƚ ? “WƌŽĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞƵƚŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ,ƵŵĂŶ&ĞƌƚŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵďƌǇŽůŽŐǇĐƚ ? ? ? ? PŽĞƐĂŽŚĞƌĞŶƚ
ŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶhŶĚĞƌƉŝŶh<>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Med. Law Int. 93-126. 
82 KŶƉƌŽĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ƐĞĞZ ?ƌŽǁŶƐǁŽƌĚ ? “,ĂƉƉǇ&ĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ?ŽŶƐĞŶƚŝŶŐŽƵƉůĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŚŝldren with 
ŝŐŶŝƚǇ P^Ğǆ^ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ^ĂǀŝŽƵƐ^ŝďůŝŶŐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )  CFLQ 435- ? ? ? ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽĂŶŐŚĞůůŝŶŝ ? “>ĞƐďŝĂŶĂŶĚ'ĂǇ
WĂƌĞŶƚƐĂŶĚZĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ PdŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶĂŶĚh<ZĞĨŽƌŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Fem. Leg. Stud. 227-
251. 
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rules to same-sex couples (the major innovation of the 2008 Act) alters the 
FRQFHSWLRQRI³IDPLO\´DVWZRSDUHQWVZKROLYHWRJHWKHUSHUPDQHQWO\DQGexclusively, 
bringing up their children without interference from any individual outside the 
nucleus.  It is for this reason that the Acts are of such little assistance in resolving 
disputes arising from attempts to exercise procreative autonomy in a non-therapeutic 
context.83 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology $FWV¶IRFXVRQPRWKHUVH[SODLQVZK\WKH\
are unable to offer much to male couples, and this suggests a deeply rooted 
understanding of parenting as a fundamentally female activity.  For ostensibly anti-
discrimination reasons, the 2008 Act addressed the needs of female couples by 
providing a mechanism to transfer parenthood from the male progenitor to the 
PRWKHU¶VSDUWQHU7KHQHHGs of male couples (such as mechanisms to protect their 
interests in surrogacy arrangements) are, of necessity, very different and quite 
palpably medical intervention offers them nothing: the 2008 Act made no attempt to 
make surrogacy arrangements more certain (even while it made parental orders after 
surrogacy available to all couples irrespective of gender-mix).  Surrogacy 
arrangements remain unenforceable, and the financial aspects of these 
arrangements remain subject to judicial oversight.84  There are sound reasons why 
the law should resist allowing surrogacy arrangements to become enforceable 
contracts,85 but as we have seen the 2008 Act, by embracing a contract model for 
unregistered opposite-sex couples and unregistered female couples, does suggest 
WKDWWKHUHLVVRPHURRPLQWKHODZ¶VGHVLJQRISDUHQWKRRGIRUHQIRUFHDEOHFRQWUDFWV.  
And it is not obvious why the exclusion of the female connection to children (which 
disproportionately inhibits male couples seeking to become parents) should always 
require judicial approval while the termination of the male connection does not.  
Neither the law nor social policy can or should ignore the differing contributions men 
                                                          
83 Callus highlights the  “ƚĂŶŐŝďůĞŝŶĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐůŝĐĞŶƐĞĚZd
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and women make to child creation but that does not mean that the existing disparity 
of treatment between female couples and male couples should not be open to 
question.  A better balance might be struck (for example) by removing judicial control 
over the financial rewards male couples are willing to offer. 
More importantly, it needs to be recognised that men, whether coupled to other men 
or not, are increasingly embracing the role of parent ± and this is to be encouraged.  
It is good social policy (for both men and women) to fashion a more gender-neutral 
view of parenting, that moves away from the ages-old allocation of parenting to the 
IHPDOHGRPDLQ7KHFDVHVGLVFXVVHGDERYHPLJKWZHOOEHVHHQ LQ6PLWK¶VZRUGV
as ³DUHJUHVVLYHHIIRUWWRLQVHUWLGHQWLILHGIDWKHUVLQWROHVELDQIDPLOLHV´.86  But it would 
be better to recognise them as attempts (if not altogether successful) to 
accommodate PHQ¶V GHVLUH WR IDVKLRQ D QHZ PRGHO RI IDWKHUKRRG which 
HQFRPSDVVHV PHDQLQJIXO LQYROYHPHQW LQ FKLOGUHQ¶V OLYHV  %RWK PHQ DQG ZRPHQ
have a mutual interest in parenthood, even when parenting is primarily provided by a 
couple of only one gender.  It would be a pity if the mutuality of interest in non-
discrimination that exists for gay men and lesbians were to founder on an increasing 
disparity of interests in relation to parenthood and parenting.  The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Acts encourage that disparity by medicalising the issue 
of same-sex parenting and by offering far more to women than to men.  It is no 
surprise that the courts struggle to accommodate a new model of either parenthood 
or parenting, for this medicalisation of the issue inhibits the law from developing an 
understanding of what it means to be a parent unshackled from millennia-old 
perceptions of the roles that women and men ought to play LQ VRFLHW\¶V PRVW
important activity ± the procreation and nurturing of children. 
                                                          
86 n.49 at p.377. 
